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JUDICIAL SUPERMAJORITIES AND 
THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES: 
HOW MAPP BECAME A FOURTH 
AMENDMENT LANDMARK INSTEAD 
OF A FIRST AMENDMENT FOOTNOTE 
Jonathan L. Entin t 
Mapp v. Ohio1 is justifiably known as a landmark of constitu-
tional criminal procedure. In that case, the United States Supreme 
Court applied the Exclusionary Rule to the states: the prosecution 
may not use evidence obtained through an unlawful search and sei-
zure. As Justice Harlan complained in dissent and as other contribu-
tors to this symposium explain, that issue was peripheral to the argu-
ments when the case was heard in the Supreme Court.2 Dollree Mapp 
did explicitly argue in the state courts that the police had violated her 
Fourth Amendment rights when they forced their way into her home 
and seized the evidence that provided the basis for her conviction 
under the Ohio obscenity statute.3 But even in the state courts, the 
Fourth Amendment took a back seat to other contentions. 
Mapp advanced two arguments relating to the obscenity statute~ 
On the facts, she claimed that she did not have possession or control 
of the books and pictures as required by the statute. She contended 
that those materials belonged to a roomer who had left before the end 
of his lease and that she had simply packed them away until here-
turned for his belongings. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this fact-
based defense. 4 
t Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. 
367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
See id. at 673 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter & Whittaker, JJ., dissenting). See also 
Dennis D. Dorin, Marshaling Mapp: Justice Tom Clark's Role in Mapp v. Ohio's Extension of 
the Exclusionary Rule to State Searches and Seizures, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401 (2001); 
Lewis Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 
471 (2001). 
3 See State v. Mapp,166 N.E.2d 387,389 (Ohio 1960). 
4 See id. (holding that Mapp had the obscene materials within her possession or under her 
control within the meaning of the Ohio obscenity statute). 
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Her other argument was that the obscenity statute was unconstitu-
tional because it effectively criminalized simple possession of ob-
scene materials and therefore was analogous to the law that was 
struck down in Smith v. California. 5 This argument had more reso-
nance with the Ohio Supreme Court: four justices endorsed Mapp's 
position about the validity of the statute.6 Unhappily for the defen-
dant, that was not sufficient to prevail on her First Amendment de-
fense. At the time, the Ohio Constitution contained the following pro-
vision: 
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the su-
preme court without the concurrence of at least all but one of 
the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the 
court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void. 7 
The court contained seven members, so four votes for invalidity 
were not enough.8 Accordingly, the obscenity law was adjudged con-
stitutional by a three-to-four margin. 
Mapp is not the only instance in which this supermajority re-
quirement resulted in a minority judgment of constitutionality. This 
article examines that unusual provision, which was adopted in 1912 
and repealed in 1968. The Ohio restriction on judicial review is not 
simply a footnote to Mapp, which alone might make it an appropriate 
subject for inclusion in a retrospective discussion of a landmark case.9 
361 U.S. 147 (1959) (invalidating an obscenity law that did not require the defendant to 
know the contents of the materials at issue). 
6 
See Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 391 ("In the opinion of Judges Taft, Bell, Herbert and Peck, 
the portion of Section 2905.34, Revised Code, upon which defendant's conviction was based, is 
constitutionally invalid, and, for that reason, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
reversed."). 
7 
OHIO CONST. art. IV,§ 2 (repealed 1968). 
Two of the four justices who thought the obscenity statute violated the First Amend-
ment also believed, as a matter of state constitutional law, that the unlawfully seized evidence 
should have been suppressed. See Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 391-94 (Herbert, J., joined by Bell, J., 
dissenting). The other two justices believed that Ohio precedent made clear that unlawfully 
seized evidence was admissible. See id. at 389-90. The three justices who thought the obscenity 
law comported with the First Amendment offered no explanation for their conclusion. 
9 
The contemporaneous commentary on Mapp either ignored the supermajority require-
ment or mentioned it only in passing. For commentary ignoring the requirement, see, e.g., 
Recent Case, 74 HARV. L. REV. 779 (1961); The Supreme Coun, 1960 Tenn: Leading Cases, 75 
HARV. L. REv. 40, 152 (1961). For commentary mentioning the requirement only in passing, 
see, e.g., Jack G. Day & Bernard A. Berkman, Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A 
Re-Examination in the Wake ofMapp v. Ohio, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 56, 57 n.4 (1961); Recent 
Development, Wolf v. Colorado Overruled: Exclusionary Rule Extended to States, 23 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 147, 147 n.3 (1962). See also Bruce L. Newman, Note, Constitutional Law-The Problem 
With Obscenity, 11 W. REs. L. REV. 669, 677 (1960); Melvin H. Reifin, Editorial Note, The 
Constitutionality of Obscenity Laws: U.S. and Ohio, 31 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 292 & n.51 
(1962). 
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It is significant for several other reasons that bear on major jurispru-
dential themes. For one thing, the Ohio provision inspired a few other 
states to require supermajorities for their courts to invalidate legisla-
tion, and two of those provisions are still in effect. For another, critics 
of the United States Supreme Court during the New Deal pointed to 
Ohio's approach as one way to limit judicial activism. Finally, the 
Ohio provision goes to the heart of debates over the role of courts and 
legislatures in a democratic society, an argument that dates to the 
American founding and promises never to end. 
I. THE ADOPTION OF THE SUPERMAJORITY RUlE 
Ohio's supermajority requirement for invalidating laws was pro-
posed by a 1912 constitutional convention. The convention was held 
pursuant to a provision under which Buckeye State voters decide 
every twenty years whether to convene such a meeting. 10 Support for 
holding a convention came from an improbable confluence of conser-
vative business interests that wanted to change the tax system and 
progressives trying to adopt the initiative and referendum as well as 
other reforms. 11 The progressives were particularly upset with a series 
of Ohio Supreme Court rulings that invalidated statutes authorizing 
mechanics' liens, 12 providing for an eight-hour day for employees on 
public works projects, 13 and regulating abusive bulk sales, 14 as well as 
other decisions narrowly construing worker-protection statutes15 and 
10 
See OHIO CONST. art. XVI, §3. This provision was included in the Ohio Constitution of 
1851, which with its amendments remains in force. Originally the vote on holding a convention 
was to occur every twenty years after 1851. The convention that proposed the superrnajority 
requirement put forward another amendment, which the voters approved, that called for con-
ducting the vote on holding a convention every twenty years after 1912. The electorate has 
decided against holding another convention since 1912. 
II 
See HOYT LANDON WARNER, PROGRESSMSM IN OHIO 1897-1917, at 295-96 (1964); 
Lloyd Luther Sponholtz, Progressivism in Microcosm: An Analysis of the Political Forces at 
Work in the Ohio Constitutional Convention' of 1912, at 18-23 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author). 
12 
See Palmer v. Tingle, 45 N.E. 313 (Ohio 1896). 
13 
See City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Constr. Co., 65 N.E. 885 (Ohio 1902). See 
also In re Preston, 59 N.E. 101 (Ohio 1900) (striking down, on freedom of contract grounds, a 
law requiring that mined coal be weighed in a manner that favored employees over employers). 
14 
See Williams & Thomas Co. v. Preslo, 95 N.E. 900 (Ohio 1911); Miller v. Crawford, 
71 N.E. 631 (Ohio 1904). The legislature had responded to Miller v. Crawford by enacting a 
new law that was designed to address the supreme court's objections, but the court held fast to 
its position in Williams & Thomas. 
15 See, e.g., Morris Coal Co. v. Donley. 76 N.E. 945 (Ohio 1906); Jacobs v. Fuller & 
Hutsinpiller Co., 65 N.E. 617 (Ohio 1902). Jacobs was especially controversial because it 
involved a claim by a 15-year-old who lost his right arm while assigned to a dangerous job in 
violation of a child labor statute. 
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invoking the fellow-servant rule, 16 contributory negligence, 17 and 
assumption of the risk18 against the claims of workers. 19 The cases 
seemed entirely consistent with U.S. Supreme Court decisions like 
Lochner v. New York, 20 which had fueled widespread opposition. 
Building on that dissatisfaction, Theodore Roosevelt addressed the 
convention on February 21, denouncing Lochner and other rulings 
that struck down reform measures,21 and proposing what he called the 
"recall" of unpopular judicial decisions by the electorate. 22 About 
three weeks later, on March 12, William Jennings Bryan supported a 
16 
See, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Burtscher, 78 N.E. 1129 (Ohio 1906) (per 
curiam); Cleveland, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Shanower, 71 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1904); Kelly Island Lime 
& Transp. Co. v. Pachuta, 69 N.E. 988 (Ohio 1904). 
17 . 
See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Archdeacon, 88 N.E. 125 (Ohio 1909); Davis v. 
Turner, 68 N.E. 819 (Ohio 1903). 
18 
See, e.g., Lima Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Hicks, 84 N.E. 1129 (Ohio 1907) (per curiam); 
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Johnston, 81 N.E. 155 (Ohio 1907); Davis v. Somers-Cambridge 
Co., 79 N.E. 233 (Ohio 1906). 
19 
Other cases narrowed the scope of employer liability in workplace tort cases. See, e.g., 
Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Frye, 88 N.E. 642 (Ohio 1909); New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 
Ropp, 81 N.E. 748 (Ohio 1907); Northern Ohio Ry. Co. v. Rigby, 68 N.E. 1046 (Ohio 1903). 
Another controversial ruling held that a railroad was not liable for the injuries suffered by chil-
dren who played with their unattended turntables. See Wheeling & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Harvey, 
83 N.E. 66 (Ohio 1907). 
20 
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, on freedom of contract grounds, a law that limited the 
working hours of bakers). See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down 
a law that forbade employers from prohibiting workers to join unions); The Employers' Liabil-
ity Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) (invalidating a worker's compensation program for employees of 
railroads and other common carriers). Compare Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (hold-
ing that a secondary boycott by a labor union violated the antitrust laws), with United States v. 
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I (1895) (holding that the antitrust laws did not apply to the Sugar 
Trust, which controlled ninety-five percent of the market, because manufacturing was not sub-
ject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause). 
21 
Roosevelt was particularly upset about a recent ruling that invalidated the worker's 
compensation statute in his home state of New York. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 
N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 210, 
212-14 (1994). The day after lves was handed down, 146 female employees were killed in the 
Triangle Shirtwaist fire in New York City. See WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FuRY: POPULISTS, 
PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 47 (1994). Roo-
sevelt also denounced the rulings that struck down the federal income tax. See Pollock v. Farm-
ers' Loan & Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
22 
See Address of Theodore Roosevelt, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 378, 384-86 (1912) [hereinafter 
PROCEEDINGS]. Roosevelt's speech refined and amplified suggestions that he had been advanc-
ing more tentatively over the previous year and a half. See Ross, supra note 21, at 131-36. His 
remarks stimulated a controversy that endured throughout the presidential election campaign 
that year. See id. at 137-51. Only Colorado adopted his suggestion for the recall of judicial 
decisions, see id. at 152, and the state supreme court invalidated the scheme. See People v. 
Max, 198 P. 150 (Colo. 1921) (state constitutional claims); People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 
198 P. 146 (Colo. 1921) (federal constitutional claims). 
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less drastic approach that would require a unanimous vote for a court 
to invalidate a law?3 
Even before Roosevelt and Bryan spoke, Cincinnati delegate 
Hiram D. Peck on January 31 had introduced Proposal No. 184, 
which contained among its provisions to streamline the state's judici-
ary the unanimity provision that Bryan had endorsed.24 The proposal 
was promptly referred to the Committee on Judiciary and Bill of 
Rights, which Peck chaired.25 As reported from the committee, Pro-
posal No. 184 provided: 
[N]o statute adopted by the general assembly shall be held 
unconstitutional and void except by the concurrence of all the 
judges of the supreme court. 26 
This unanimity requirement was part of a larger package designed 
to streamline what had become an antediluvian judicial structure. 
Under the 1851 constitution as amended in 1883, the six-member 
supreme court sat atop a pyramid of circuit courts and a bewildering 
array of trial and specialized courts. This unwieldy arrangement led to 
numerous difficulties. For example, the supreme court was nearly 
three years behind on its docket. 27 This resulted partly from the 
court's expansive appellate jurisdiction, which enabled litigants to 
obtain review of circuit court judgments as a matter of right,28 and 
partly from its operating procedures: the tribunal ordinarily sat in 
panels of three but had to reconsider en bane all cases in which the 
panel was divided or in which the constitutionality of a federal or 
state statute was questioned. 29 Peck's proposed solution was to rede-
fine the court's appellate jurisdiction and assign most review of trial 
courts to the newly named court of appeals, which replaced the circuit 
courts. 30 The thrust of the changes was to promote the concept of 
"one trial and one review."31 At the same time, Proposal No. 184 left 
23 
See William J. Bryan, Address on the Subject of "The People's Law," PROCEEDINGS, 
supra note 22, at 663, 669-70. 
24 
See id. at 143-44. 
25 
See id. at 146. 
26 
/d. at 1028. 
27 
See 1 A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND LA WYERS OF OHIO !53 (Carrington T. Marshall 
ed., 1934) [hereinafter MARSHALL]. 
28 
Peck described the circuit courts, which reviewed decisions of the various trial courts, 
as "only a sieve through which everyone goes to the supreme court." PROCEEDINGS, supra note 
22, at 1026. 
29 
See I MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 223. 
30 
See id. at 154. 
31 
Francis J. Amer7 The Growth and Develop1nent of the Ohio Judicial System, in I 
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one feature of the supreme court intact: despite widespread concern 
about tie votes in a six-member tribunal, the size of the court was 
unchanged in the original draft. Instead, the draft provided that an 
equal division would result in the affrrmance of the judgment below.32 
The unanimity requirement consumed much of the five days of 
debate when the Committee on Judiciary and Bill of Rights brought 
the proposal to the floor. The issue was joined almost immediately 
between those who believed that the Ohio Supreme Court had over-
stepped its bounds by striking down innovative laws designed to deal 
with modern developments and those who viewed the judiciary as 
simply doing its traditional job of assuring that statutes comported 
with the state and federal constitutions. 
Peck began on April 3 by conceding that the idea of unanimity 
was controversial but complained: "There have been too many judg-
ments that have been made by the [supreme] court which seem to the 
people not well grounded, in view of existing circumstances, and 
which operate as stumbling blocks to progress, upsetting statutes 
which were desirable in themselves .... "33 Delegate William Wor-
thington, another Cincinnati lawyer, responded that the proposal was 
"at war with the very theory of jurisprudence."34 Delegate James W. 
Halfhill, a lawyer from Lima, raised another objection that would be a 
recurring theme of critics, that the requirement of a unanimous vote 
would give too much power to a single justice: "Do you not think that 
this is making too much of a certainty and too much of the dominance 
of one man on the court?"35 Peck shot back that the current situation, 
under which the court could invalidate a law by a three-to-two vote, 
already gave one person too much power. 36 
The flavor of the arguments is revealed by the following ex-
change between two other lawyer delegates, Humphrey Jones of 
Bloomingburg and D.F. Anderson of Youngstown, during the third 
day of debate on April 9: 
MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 181,207. 
32 
Peck explained that the drafters left the size of the court unchanged to deflect criticism 
that "the lawyers were creating new offices for themselves to fill," a charge that contributed to 
the defeat of recommendations by the previous constitutional convention in 1874. 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at I 027. He ex: pressed willingness to accept a seven-member high 
court if the delegates preferred an odd number, though. See id. 
33 
ld. at 1028. 
34 
I d. at 1048. Both Peck and Worthington were judges. See WARNER, supra note II, at 
312. 
35 
36 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1029. 
See id. 
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Mr. JONES: Suppose you have a case in the common 
pleas court where the common pleas judge holds the law un-
constitutional, and the court of appeals also holds it unconsti-
tutional. Now you go to the supreme court of six judges, and 
five of them declare it unconstitutional. Do you think it the 
right thing to let that one man in the supreme court defeat the 
judgment of the five members of the supreme court, the three 
circuit judges [of the court of appeals], and the common pleas 
judge? 
Mr. ANDERSON: You didn't start back far enough. 
Where did the act come from? 
Mr. JONES: Do you think it right to let one member of 
the supreme court, by his individual judgment, defeat the 
judgment of the other nine judges that the law was unconsti-
tutional? 
Mr. ANDERSON: You didn't start back far enough. In 
the first place, take the house of representatives. We presume 
there are a number of lawyers elected to the house, and we 
presume they are moderately well posted in the law .... It 
may be a violent presumption, but we will presume for the 
sake of argument that they are, and those lawyers give their 
best efforts to framing the law. Then from the house of repre-
sentatives the act goes to the senate, and we will presume the 
senate has a like proportion of lawyers, who give their best 
attention to the consideration of the proposed law. And the 
house and senate pass it and then it goes to the governor . . . 
and then we will presume that the governor, after careful con-
sideration, does not veto it but approves it, and of course if 
there is any question concerning the constitutionality of the 
law he will ask the advice of his attorney general. 37 
447 
Jones and other critics worried that an obstinate, willful, or cor-
rupt judge would vote to uphold improper laws, whereas Anderson 
and other supporters of unanimity believed that elected officials had 
an independent obligation to determine whether legislation satisfied 
constitutional requirements and that those determinations were enti-
tled to more deference than the judiciary had accorded them. The 
37 
/d. at 1090-91. 
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debate spilled over to a fourth day, with advocates of judicial review 
invoking Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison38 
and supporters of the unanimity requirement sometimes implying that 
they opposed giving courts the power to overturn statutes at all. 39 
Peck repudiated that extreme position, though, explaining: "[Judicial 
.review] is part of our system and we are not trying to take it away by 
this proposal. ... The question is, how many judges should it require 
in order to declare an act unconstitutional?"40 
Much of the debate focused on the proposal's details rather than 
on the legitimacy of judicial review. For example, Peck quickly 
agreed to drop "adopted by the general assembly" when one delegate 
pointed out that the proposal's language would not cover legislation 
passed by the people through initiative and referendum, which was 
one of the major reforms to come out of the convention.41 Delegate 
Frank Taggart of Wooster offered a substitute proposal providing for 
a seven-member supreme court that could declare laws unconstitu-
tional with the support of at least five justices. This smaller superma-
jority requirement recognized the legitimacy of complaints about ju-
dicial overreaching while avoiding the pitfalls of giving one justice an 
effective veto. "There you have one more than a majority and it gives 
additional moral force and effect," Taggart explained. 42 Peck did not 
respond immediately. 
Five days later, on the afternoon of April 9, Edmund King, a law-
yer from Sandusky and a strong critic of the unanimity requirement, 
asked Peck about the full reach of the proposal. King wondered 
whether a single supreme court justice could effectively reverse a 
unanimous court of appeals judgment holding a statute unconstitu-
tional.43 Peck then responded to Taggart's alternative by offering a 
38 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1110 (remarks 
of Delegate Edmund B. King) (observing that "[a] court would be no longer a court" if it re-
fused to determine the constitutionality of a statute when that question was "properly presented 
before it"). 
39 
See, e.g., PRocEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1079 (remarks of Delegate Stanley E. 
Bowdle) (characterizing judicial review as "[t]his usurpation of power"). One delegate, Cleve-
land carpenter Harry D. Thomas, offered an amendment that would have prohibited the supreme 
court from declaring any measure unconstitutional. See id. at 1101. See also id. at 1117 (re-
marks of Delegate Thomas) (denouncing the court for "practically nullif(ying] every safety law 
made for the protection of workers in this state by their decisions on assumed risk, contributory 
negligence and fellow-servant rule"). That idea was quietly tabled the next day. See id. at 1129. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
See id. at 1125. 
See id. at 1028. 
ld. at 1065. 
See id. at 1128. 
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revised version that left the supreme court as a six-member body but 
allowed a five-person majority to invalidate a law.44 
The next morning Peck conceded that an across-the-board una-
nimity rule "would be not workable" in the situation King posited.45 
Accordingly, the Cincinnatian produced yet another refinement: the 
supreme court would have to be unanimous to strike down a law "[i]n 
any case wherein the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed";46 
it would take only a simple majority to affirm a court of appeals 
judgment of invalidity.47 He also made clear that the unanimity rule 
would not apply to cases arising under the supreme court's original 
jurisdiction.48 
Now,. however, another objection arose. S.A. Hoskins, a Wapa-
koneta lawyer, questioned the practicality of unanimity because not 
all justices could participate in every case. The illness or recusal of 
one member would, under Peck's proposal, preclude the court from 
invalidating a law on constitutional grounds, at least when the court 
of appeals had upheld the measure. Hoskins therefore proposed to 
require that "all but one" justice go along with a finding of unconsti-
tutionality. He explained: "Some one man on the court may have an 
accident. He may be run over, or he may be sick and disabled .... If 
we can not trust five of our supreme judges to pronounce a decision 
on any proposition we are entertaining a very small opinion of 
them."49 
After some additional questions, John D. Fackler of East Cleve-
land offered a reworded supermajority clause: 
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the su-
preme court without the concurrence of all but one of the 
judges sitting in the case, except in affirming a judgment of 
the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and 
void. 5° 
44 
45 
46 
47 
See id. at 1130. 
/d. at 1141. 
/d. at 1140. 
Seeid. 
48 
See id. at 1142. At this point D.F. Anderson, perhaps the strongest proponent of una-
nimity, lamented the limited scope of the requirement: it would apply only when the supreme 
court reversed a court of appeals judgroent upholding a law's constitutionality, not when the 
lower court had found a law unconstitutional or when cases began in the supreme court. "That 
is not much of a reform," he remarked. Peck replied: "That is all we can get." /d. 
49 /d. at 1143. 
50 /d. at 1145. 
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This language embodied King's concern about giving one justice an 
effective veto over affirming a court of appeals judgment of invalid-
ity, which Peck had already accepted. Fackler's amendment actually 
went beyond Hoskins' concern about a single justice's absence effec-
tively preventing the high court from reversing the court of appeals 
and striking down a law. The "all but one" provision sufficed to ad-
dress that problem; limiting the focus to the justices "sitting in the 
case" effectively lowered the supermajority requirement, implying 
that the votes of all but two members could hold a law unconstitu-
tional if one justice dissented and another did not participate. Never-
theless, Peck accepted Fackler's wording as a friendly amendment.51 
Perhaps more surprising, Anderson, the most vocal proponent of una-
nimity when the debate began, also supported Fackler's language.52 
Fackler apparently realized the problem with his amendment, because 
a little later he offered a revised version that deleted the "sitting in the 
case" phrase. As revised, his amendment now provided: 
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the su-
preme court without the concurrence of all but one of the 
judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the court of 
appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void.53 
The delegates approved this version by a vote of 94-5.54 That af-
ternoon the question of the size of the supreme court arose once more. 
George W. Knight, a law professor at Ohio State University, proposed 
increasing the court to seven members. This would, he explained, 
prevent the confusion that might arise if two courts of appeals dis-
agreed on a law's constitutionality and the supreme court divided 
three-to-three, which according to another provision of the proposal 
meant that both judgments would be affirmed. 55 Peck responded that 
this situation was extremely unlikely to arise and repeated his earlier 
wish to avoid giving comfort to critics who might object to the crea-
tion of new judgeships. 56 After some further desultory discussion, 
51 
52 
See id. 
See id. 
53 
/d. at 1147. 
/d. 
54 
55 
See id. at 1158; supra text accompanying note 32. 
56 
See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1159; supra note 32. Peck added that he opposed 
reducing the court to five members because that would force the ouster of a sitting judge, which 
ntight also engender voter opposition. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1159. 
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Knight's amendment and several others were tabled and Proposal No. 
184 was approved on second reading, 78-28.57 
Seven weeks later, on May 27, the proposal returned to the floor 
for third reading. Delegate Taggart, who had opposed the measure on 
second reading, renewed his suggestion for a seven-member court 
consisting of a chief justice and six others. 58 Unlike Professor Knight, 
who had favored seven justices to minimize the likelihood of tie 
votes, Taggart explained that the court needed a chief justice. The 
1851 constitution made no separate provision for such a position.59 
Taggart argued that the chief justice would have important supervi-
sory and administrative responsibilities over the entire judicial 
branch. Establishing the position of chief justice as a constitutional 
office would help the supreme court and improve the efficiency of the 
judiciary throughout the state. 60 This time Peck agreed, noting that he 
regarded a chief justice as "very desirable."61 
Meanwhile, the supermajority requirement for declaring laws un-
constitutional was changed stylistically by the addition of the words 
"at least" before "all but one." The final version read as follows: 
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the su-
preme court without the concurrence of at least all but one of 
the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the 
court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void. 62 
This version was supported on third reading by a vote of 97-5.63 
Four days later, on May 31, it returned to the floor unchanged from 
the Committee on Arrangements and Phraseology and was formally 
endorsed by a tally of 93-6.64 On September 3, the voters narrowly 
approved the entire package of changes in the judicial system, includ-
ing the supermajority requirement, by a 52-48 percent margin. 65 That 
57 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1163. 
58 
See id. at 1832; supra text accompanying note 42. 
59 
See 1 MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 222-23. Implementing the I883 constitutional 
amendment, the legislature had defined the position of chief justice in terms of seniority: the 
six-member tribunal was divided into two panels of three, with the senior member of each panel 
presiding and the more senior of those designated as chief justice of the entire court when it sat 
en bane. See Amer, supra note 31, at 206. 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at I 832. 
/d. 
/d. at I833. 
/d. 
/d. at 1957. 
65 
The popular vote was 264,922 in favor and 244,375 against. /d. at 2I I2. This proposal 
would have lost without strong support in urban counties in Northeast Ohio. See Sponholtz, 
supra note I I, at 244-45. 
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provision would remain on the books for more than half a century 
before its many problems led to its repeal. 
ll. THE SUPERMAJORITY RULE IN ACTION 
As approved by the voters, the supermajority requirement applied 
to all cases within the Ohio Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and 
to those cases within its appellate jurisdiction in which the court of 
appeals had upheld the constitutionality of the law at issue. The re-
quirement did not apply, however, when the supreme court was re-
viewing a court of appeals decision holding a law unconstitutional. 
The requirement's terms left open several important questions: What 
was a "law"? What did it mean to say that the supreme court "held" a 
law "unconstitutional and void"? What were lower courts to do when 
a majority, but less than the requisite supermajority, concluded that a 
law was unconstitutional? All of these questions would arise in due 
course. In the end, although the supermajority requirement generated 
principled opposition, 66 it was ultimately done in as much by some 
entirely foreseeable practical difficulties as by renewed appreciation 
of the value of judicial review. Perhaps the most troublesome problem 
related to the exception for laws that had been found unconstitutional 
by the court of appeals, which held out the prospect that the validity 
of a statute would turn on what a lower court had decided. 
To the extent that the supermajority requirement was intended to 
remind the supreme court that the people wanted the judiciary to 
show greater deference to the legislature, the message came through 
loud and clear. In one of the first post -1912 cases challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute, Chief Justice Hugh Nichols observed 
that the new requirement "reminded [us] that [the power of judicial 
review] should· be exercised with the greatest possible care and re-
serve. "
67 It is difficult to assess the extent to which the provision ac-
66 
Delegate David J. Nye, an Elyria lawyer, told the convention that a simple majority 
vote should suffice for the supreme court to find a law unconstitutional and warned that the 
supermajority requirement was "wrong in principle and wrong in practice." PROCEEDINGS, 
supra note 22, at 1145. Outside Ohio, one commentator denounced the requirement only a few 
weeks after the voters approved it, expressing the hope that "no other state will follow the 
example of Ohio by limiting the scope of judicial power" and that the Buckeye State would 
soon rethink this foolish experiment in legislative omnipotence. Everett P. Wheeler, The New 
Constitution of Ohio-Power of Courts to Review Acts of the Legislatures, 75 CENT. L.J. 437, 
442 (1912). Wheeler accompanied his denunciation of the new provision with a blast at "ambu-
lance chasers" who were cluttering up the judicial system with tort cases they handled on a 
contingency basis. See id. at 441-42. AI; evidence of the need for judicial control of legislatures, 
he cited the Reconstruction Era and noted approvingly that the withdrawal of federal troops 
from the former Confederacy allowed "the white people of those states ... to manage their 
affairs in their own way." I d .. at 440. 
67 
State ex reL Turner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 117 N.E. 232, 234 (Ohio 1917). 
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tually affected decisions, however, because the Ohio Supreme Court 
rarely invoked the supermajority provision as a basis for deferring to 
the legislature. 68 
The first case in which the supermajority provision clearly af-
fected the outcome was Barker v. City of Akron.69 In this 1918 deci-
sion, four justices believed that a state law requiring counties to pay 
the cost of municipal special elections was unconstitutiona1.70 Be-
cause the court of appeals had upheld the law's validity, it took six 
justices to overturn the measure. Accordingly, the minority of three 
justices effectively prevailed, and the court was obliged to affirm the 
lower court's judgment. 71 
It took another four years for the Ohio Supreme Court to muster a 
six-justice majority to invalidate a law that the court of appeals had 
upheld, but even that case revealed some unanticipated complexities. 
The 1922 ruling in Morton v. State72 struck down a law that prohib-
ited a criminal defendant who was in custody from deposing out-of-
state material witnesses who would not be available to testify at trial. 
The statute permitted defendants who were not in custody to conduct 
such out-of-state depositions. Four justices subscribed to an opinion 
holding the statute unconstitutional and requiring that the defendant 
be permitted to conduct his out-of-state depositions.73 Two other jus-
tices noted their agreement that the statute unconstitutionally denied 
equal protection to in-custody defendants but concluded that the de-
fendant was not entitled to conduct his depositions.74 On this basis, 
the majority opinion claimed that the requisite six justices "con-
curr[ed] in the [statute's] unconstitutionality,"75 although another 
member characterized the situation as "a plain concession on the part . 
68 
Only a handful of cases in the first quarter-century after the supermajority requirement 
was adopted seem to have been affected by its provisions, but analysis of voting patterns cannot 
give a complete picture because the court might not explicitly acknowledge the requirement's 
impact in some cases. See Katherine B. Fite & Louis Baruch Rubinstein, Curbing the Supreme 
Court-State Experiences and Federal Proposals, 35 MICH. L. REV. 762,774 (1937). 
69 
121 N.E. 646 (Ohio 1918) (per curiam). 
70 
The law exempted counties from paying for municipai general elections. See W. Rol-
land Maddox, Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio, 24 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 638, 639 
(1930). 
71 
See Barker, 121 N.E. at 646. 
72 
138 N.E. 45 (Ohio 1922). 
73 
See id. at 47-48. 
74 One justice explained that the defendant had failed to show that his witnesses could not 
testify at trial. See id. at 49 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting). The other did not explain his reason-
ing. See id. at 48 (Johnson, J., concurring in the fust proposition of the syllabus [finding the 
statute unconstitutional] but not in the judgment). 
75 Jd. at47. 
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of two of the judges" designed to get around the supermajority re-
quirement. 76 
At times the court tried to evade the supermajority requirement. 
For example, in Patten v. Aluminum Castings Co., 77 a five-member 
majority voted to overturn a judgment for an employee who had been 
badly injured in a fall from a defective scaffold. At issue was a statute 
imposing liability on employers who provided defective scaffolding. 
If the statute were valid, its violation permitted the employee to re-
cover in tort; if not, he could only obtain a smaller worker's compen-
sation a ward. Three members of the court concluded that the scaffold-
ing statute was not a "lawful requirement" within the meaning of the 
Worker's Compensation Clause of the Ohio Constitution because it 
was impermissibly vague.78 Two other justices agreed that the em-
ployee could not recover in tort but emphasized that they were ex-
pressing no view on the statute's validity. 79 One of the concurring 
members, Chief Justice Carrington Marshall, warned that the lead 
opinion had effectively invalidated the scaffolding law without once 
using the word "unconstitutional" in a clear attempt to circumvent the 
supermajority requirement. 80 
In a sense, Patten had a limited impact because its specific hold-
ing about the definition of a "lawful requirement" was overruled the 
following year. 81 But Chief Justice Marshall's warning proved pro-
phetic in another sense. He noted that the courts of appeals had 
reached conflicting conclusions about whether various statutes were 
lawful requirements for worker's compensation purposes. This held 
out the prospect that the number of votes required for the supreme 
court to overturn those statutes would depend on what each court of 
appeals had concluded. His prediction was soon vindicated in a series 
of worker's compensation cases, although not ones dealing with the 
meaning of lawful requirements. Meanwhile, the problem also arose 
in another area where it would take a decade to unsnarl. 
76 
Bd. of Educ. v. City of Columbus, 160 N.E. 902, 904 (Ohio 1928). This opinion was 
written by Chief Justice Carrington Marshall, who had dissented in Morton. See Morton, 138 
N .E. at 48 (Marshall, C.J ., dissenting). 
77 
136 N.E. 426 (Ohio 1922). 
78 
See id. at 428. 
79 
See id. at 431 (Hough, J ., concurring) ("I know of no reason by which the constitution-
ality of the act can be assailed."); id. at 432 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) ("I concur in the judg-
ment ... solely upon the ground that there is no evidence shown by the record to support the 
verdict [against the employer]."). 
80 
!d. at 436 (Marshall, C.J ., dissenting). 
81 
See Ohio Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Fender, 141 N.E. 269, 277 (Ohio 1923). 
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The importance of the court of appeals first became painfully ap-
parent in the field of worker's compensation, which was one of the 
main areas of contention leading to the adoption of the supermajority 
requirement. In the 1923 case of DeWitt v. State ex rel. Crabbe, 82 two 
members of the court upheld a statute that imposed a fifty percent 
penalty against deadbeat employers. The statute gave employers the 
option of paying premiums to the state worker's compensation fund 
or promptly paying the full amount of any worker's compensation 
award to an injured employee; the fifty percent assessment applied if 
the employer chose neither option. 83 Five justices believed that the 
penalty provision violated state and federal guarantees of due process 
and equal protection}4 but the supermajority requirement meant that 
the contrary views of the two minority members prevailed. 85 In a 
sense, this ruling vindicated the progressive reformers who believed 
that the supermajority requirement would make it more difficult for 
the supreme court to strike down worker-protection laws. But this 
victory proved to be short-lived. Other courts of appeals declined to 
follow the judgment in De Witt, choosing instead to endorse the ma-
jority view. Five years later, in State ex rel. Bredwell v. Hershner, 86 a 
six-to-one majority held that the fifty percent penalty was in fact un-
constitutional, thereby effectively overruling De Witt. 87 
These cases highlighted a major problem with the supermajority 
requirement. The exception allowing a simple majority of the su-
preme court to declare a law unconstitutional when the court of ap-
peals had reached the same conclusion left open the prospect that the 
number of votes required for the supreme court to strike down· a law 
would vary depending on what conclusion the lower court had 
reached. De Witt demonstrated that this entirely foreseeable situation 
was more than hypothetical. Hershner resolved the problem with re-
gard to the fifty percent penalty statute, but the underlying difficulty 
of varying majorities remained unabated. 
The problem had arisen again even before Hershner was decided. 
This time it appeared in connection with a statute that required mu-
nicipalities to provide free water service to public schools. In City of 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
141 N.E. 551 (Ohio 1923). 
See id. at 554-55. 
See id. at 557. 
See id. 
161 N.E. 334 (Ohio 1928). 
See id. at 335. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on another issue, how-
ever. The lower court erroneously overturned the entire judgment rather than simply setting 
aside the fifty percent penalty, so the supreme court reinstated the award without the penalty. 
See id. at 335-36. 
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East Cleveland v. Board of Education,88 five justices concluded that 
the free-water law was unconstitutional.89 Because the court of ap-
peals had upheld the statute, the supermajority requirement applied 
and required affrrmance on a two-to-five vote. This situation was so 
disconcerting that Chief Justice Marshall began his dissenting opinion 
by paraphrasing the opening sentence of the Declaration of Independ-
ence to complain about the "separate though inferior station to which 
the amendment of 1912 has consigned" the majority.90 Three years 
later, after a different court of appeals had invalidated the same stat-
ute despite the minority judgment in City of East Cleveland, the five-
member majority this time prevailed: in Board of Education v. City of 
Columbus91 the free-water statute was struck down by a five-to-two 
vote. Chief Justice Marshall, writing again for the majority but this 
time in an opinion announcing the judgment, explained that the two 
cases were "in every essential detail identical" and that the court's 
personnel had not changed in the interim.92 Although the syllabus in 
the Columbus case purported to overrule City of East Cleveland,93 the 
opinion more accurately described the real situation: the free-water 
law was unconstitutional in Columbus but constitutional in East 
Cleveland, an absurdity directly attributable to the supermajority re-
quirement and its peculiar exception.94 The immediate problem was 
88 
148 N.E. 350 (Ohio 1925). 
89 
See id. at 350 ("[t]here being less [sic] than six judges" who regard the law as unconsti-
tutional); id. at 354 (Marshall, C.J., joined by Matthias, Allen, Kinkade & Robinson, JJ., dis-
senting) ("In the opinion of the majority of this court, [the law] should be declared to be uncon-
stitutional .... "). 
90 
ld. at 352 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). The full passage reads: 
When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court of Ohio to differ from the judgment pro-
nounced by the minority, and to assume the separate though inferior sta-
tion to which the amendment of 1912 has consigned them, a decent re-
spect to the opinions of the bench and bar of the state requires that they 
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. 
ld. at 352-53. 
91 
160 N.E. 902 (Ohio 1928). 
92 
ld. at 902. 
93 
See id. (syllabus 'II 1) ("That portion of [the law] which prohibits a city or village or 
waterworks department thereof from making a charge for supplying water for the use of the 
public school building or other public buildings ... is unconstitutional and void."). 
94 
See id. at 903 (describing the resulting state of affairs as a "deplorable situation"). In 
fact, the whole affair was even more bizarre than the text suggests. After losing its initial chal-
lenge to the free-water law, the City of East Cleveland contrived to bring a second challenge in 
a different court. Although its first suit went to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dis-
trict, which upheld the law, city authorities somehow managed to get the second case heard by 
the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, which ordinarii y lacked jurisdiction over cases 
arising in Cuyahoga County and which likewise upheld the law. See id. at 902-03. The City of 
Columbus, which was located in a different appellate district, filed its challenge in an admitted 
effort "to make effective the opinion of a majority of the Supreme Court" in the East Cleveland 
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resolved in 1935, ten years after City of East Cleveland, when six 
justices subscribed to a per curiam opinion invalidating the free-water 
law.95 
Two other problems with the supermajority requirement also 
emerged. One concerned its application to municipal ordinances. The 
court got hopelessly tangled up in this problem in two 1927 cases. In 
Fullwood v. City of Canton,96 five justices thought that a particular 
ordinance was unconstitutional, and three justices believed that the 
supermajority requirement did not apply to local ordinances.97 This 
meant that four members thought that a simple majority could invali-
date the ordinance, but those four members split evenly over the va-
lidity of the particular ordinance. Because two of the four justices 
who believed that a simple majority was sufficient also believed that 
the particular ordinance was valid, they refused to subscribe to a rul-
ing of invalidity.98 Throwing up its collective hands in confusion, the 
supreme court simply affirmed the court of appeals judgment uphold-
ing the ordinance. 99 A similarly puzzling division occurred later that 
same year in Meyers v. Copelan, 100 resulting in a judgment upholding 
the validity of a Cincinnati ordinance that forbade jewelry auctions. 
This time four justices thought the ordinance unconstitutional, but 
three of those four also believed that the supermajority requirement 
applied to local ordinances. 101 Because the court of appeals had up-
held the ordinance, 102 there were not enough votes to strike it down. 103 
Seven years later, on rehearing in Village of Brewster v. Hill, 104 the 
court unanimously held that the supermajority requirement did not 
apply to municipal ordinances. 105 
case. /d. at 903. 
95 
See Bd. of Educ. v. Village of Willard, 199 N.E. 74 (Ohio 1935) (per curiam). In this 
case the court of appeals had followed the Columbus decision, which meant that the supreme 
court in affirming needed only four votes. The unanimous ruling by the six participating justices 
was not technically necessary but sufficed once and for all to inter the free-water statute. 
96 
158 N.E. 171 (Ohio) (per curiam), error dismissed, 275 U.S. 484 (1927). Although the 
opinion is silent on the matter, the ordinance reportedly dealt with the licensing of electricians. 
See Robert L. Hausser, Limiting the Voting Power of the Szipreme Court: Procedure in the 
States, 5 OHIO ST. LJ. 54, 77 (1938). 
97 
See Fullwood, 158 N.E. at 172. 
98 
Seeid. 
99 
See id. at 171-72. 
100 
160 N.E. 855 (Ohio 1927) (per curiam). 
101 
See id. at 855-56. 
102 
See id. at 855. 
103 
See id. at 856. 
104 
191 N.E. 366 (Ohio 1934). 
105 
The court based its conclusion on the 1912 convention's repeated use of the word "Jaw" 
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The other problem with the supermajority requirement concerned 
nonparticipating judges, an issue that had generated discussion at the 
1912 convention.106 It quickly 'became apparent that it would be 
nearly impossible to invalidate a law with less than a full bench. The 
absence of three members in the 1922 case of McBride v. White Mo-
tor Co. 107 immediately doomed a challenge to the constitutionality of 
a state law that prohibited Ohio taxpayers from deducting federal tax 
payments on their state tax returns. 108 Similarly, in Royal Green 
Coach Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 109 an original action seek-
ing judicial review of an agency decision refusing to authorize new 
bus service between the cities of Dayton and Hamilton, one justice 
did not sit. 110 This meant that the remaining six justices would have to 
agree that the regulatory statute at issue was unconstitutional in order 
for the challenge to succeed. In fact, only one justice sympathized 
with the constitutional argument, but he conceded that none of his 
colleagues agre~d with him. 111 
Meanwhile, the court continued occasionally to invoke the su-
permajority requirement to uphold the constitutionality of laws that 
most justices regarded as invalid. For example, in State ex ref. Jones 
v. Zangerle, 112 a three-to-four vote upheld a statute that increased the 
per diem payment to judges sitting by assigrtment outside their home 
jurisdiction. The Cuyahoga County auditor refused to pay the higher 
amount to a visiting judge because of a constitutional prohibition 
against increasing judicial salaries during their term of office. The 
visiting judge had been elected before the higher per diem was en-
acted.113 Three justices believed that the law increasing per diem 
to refer to measures enacted by the legislature and by its use of the word "statute" in explanation 
of the supermajority requirement provided to voters, but the opinion did not refer to the actual 
convention debates. See id. at 367. The entire problem might have been avoided had anyone 
examined the debates, which demonstrated that the word "law" was substituted for "statute 
adopted by the general assembly" out of concern that a simple majority could invalidate a meas-
ure adopted by initiative. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
106 
See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. 
107 
140 N.E. 942 (Ohio 1922) (per curiam). 
108 
The four participating justices split two-to-two on the question, although only one of 
those who regarded the provision as unconstitutional noted a formal dissenting vote. See id. at 
942. 
109 
143 N.E. 547 (Ohio 1924). 
liD See id. at 549. 
Ill See id. at 547-48. The court went on to hold unanimously that the record contained no 
evidence that the agency had abused its discretion in deciding not to grant the challenger a 
certificate to operate bus service between the two cities. See id. at 548-49. 
112 
!59 N.E. 564 (Ohio 1927). 
113 
See id. at 564. 
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payments to visiting judges was valid because the state's Emoluments 
Clause applied to regular salaries but not to payments for special as-
signments. 114 This minority vote was enough to sustain the increased 
per diem, because the case arose as an original action so that the su-
permajority requirement applied if the measure were to be struck 
down. 115 A similar three-to-four vote in another original action, State 
ex rei. Williams v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 116 upheld a law 
authorizing payments to injured employees of insolvent employers 
who were unable to pay worker's compensation premiums to the 
state. Four justices thought this scheme was unconstitutional, but once 
more the supermajority requirement allowed the minority who saw 
the measure as permissible to prevai1. 117 
The supermajority controversy persisted through the 1920s, with 
matters coming to a head in Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion 
in the Columbus case. He denounced the provision as "destroy[ing]" 
what he called "the most important function of courts of last resort": 
to reconcile conflicting rulings by lower courts. 118 Marshall devoted 
several more pages to denouncing the 1912 measure, 119 but much of 
the steam went out of the debate in 1930 after the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected a federal constitutional challenge to the supermajority re-
quirement. In Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dis-
trict, 12° Chief Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court in turning 
aside taxpayer objections to the state's procedures for creating and 
maintaining public parks. The Ohio Supreme Court, by a two-to-five 
I 14 
I 15 
I 16 
I 17 
See id. at 565. 
See id. 
156 N.E. 101 (Ohio 1927). 
See id. at 102, 104. Sometimes a minority invoked the superrnajority requirement in 
cases where it did not seem to apply. For example, two justices concluded that it would be 
unconstitutional to permit a referendum on an administrative reorganization act that had been 
passed as an emergency measure because the 1912 amendments exempted emergency measures 
from referendum procedures. See State ex rei. Durbin v. Smith, 133 N.E. 457,460 (Ohio 1921) 
(per curiam). A taxpayer sought a referendum because he regarded the emergency justifications 
as spurious. See id. at 457. The fundamental issue was the extent to which courts must accept a 
legislative emergency declaration at face value. See id. at 461; id. at 462 (Marshall, CJ., dis-
senting). Although this issue might have been couched in constitutional terms, see id. at 469 
(Johnson, J., dissenting); id. at 474 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting), it need not have been, see id. at 
463 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The constitutionality of the [statute] is not an issue in this con-
troversy."). The same result occurred in a companion case. See State ex rei. Burke v. Smith, 133 
N.E. 480 (Ohio 1921) (per curiam) (denying relief for the reasons set forth in Durbin). 
118 
Bd. ofEduc. v. City ofCo1umbus, 160 N.E. 902,903 (Ohio 1928). 
119 
See id. at 903-05 ("This amendment to the Ohio Constitution is without a parallel in any 
state in the Union."). 
120 
281 U.S. 74 (1930), aff'g State ex rei. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 166 N.E. 407 
(Ohio 1929). 
460 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:441 
vote, upheld the constitutionality of the statutes at issue. 121 Hughes 
first rebuffed a due process challenge to the supermajority require-
ment on the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment does not ordinar-
ily mandate any right to appeal from a fundamentally fair lower court 
proceeding. 122 He also dismissed an equal protection argument by 
noting that the challengers had failed to show that similarly situated 
Ohioans had been treated differently: although the East Cleveland and 
Columbus cases demonstrated the possibility of conflicting rulings 
about the same statute, there had been no such conflict in connection 
with the park-district law, so it was premature to address an issue that 
might not ultimately entail a federal constitutional violation. 123 
The U.S. Supreme Court never again addressed the validity of 
Ohio's supermajority requirement. 124 The legal controversy abated to 
some extent for a time, although debate continued in academic jour-
nals in the wake of Bryant. 125 The requirement also attracted attention 
during the New Deal disputes that culminated in President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt's abortive Court-packing scheme. 126 
But the supermajority requirement did not go away. It remained 
on the books and sporadically affected the outcome of cases. After a 
hiatus of more than a dozen years, the Ohio Supreme Court struck 
down a sloppily drafted liquor-control measure in State v. Chester. 127 
At issue was a provision prohibiting public possession of "an opened 
bottle, flask or container."128 An earlier phrase in the same provision 
forbade possession of "an opened bottle, flask or container, contain-
121 
See Ohio ex rei. Bryant. 281 U.S. at 77; State ex rei. Bryant, 166 N.E. at 415. 
122 
See Ohio ex rei. Bryant, 281 U.S. at 80. 
123 See id. at 80-81. 
124 See Gottlieb v. Mahoning Valley Sanitary Dist., 281 U.S. 770 (1930}, dismissing ap-
pealfrom Shook v. Mahoning Valley Sanitary Dist., 166 N.E. 415 (Ohio 1929) (rejecting con-
stitutional challenges to a statutory scheme analogous to the park-district law baEed on many of 
the same arguments that were presented in the park cases). 
125 
See, e.g., Carl L. Meier, Power of the Ohio Supreme Court to Declare Laws 
Unconstitutional, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 293 (1931) (criticizing the requirement); Edwin 0. Stene, Is 
There Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio?, 9 U. CIN. L. REv. 23 (1935) (offering 
qualified support for the requirement); Harvey Walker, Need for Constitutional Revision in 
Ohio, 4 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 348 (1930) (urging repeal of the requirement). Scholarly criticism 
continued in later years. See, e.g., Warren Cunningham, The Judiciary in Ohio, 20 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 239, 260 (1951). 
126 
See, e.g., Fite & Rubinstein, supra note 68, at 773-79; Osmond K. Fraenkel, What Can 
Be Done About the Constitution and the Supreme Court?, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 212, 222-23 
(1937); Hausser, supra note 96, at 56-84. The Ohio rule also figured in the debate over Senator 
William E. Borah's unsuccessfull923 proposal to require a seven-justice majority for the U.S. 
Supreme Court to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional. See Ross, supra note 21, at 225-26; 
see generally id. at 218-32. 
127 
42 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 1942). 
128 ld. at 994-95. 
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ing intoxicating liquor, in a state liquor store."129 Four of the six par-
ticipating justices concluded that the omission of the qualifying 
phrase "containing intoxicating liquor" from the public-possession 
clause rendered that clause unconstitutional. 130 The other two justices 
treated the omission as a slip of the legislative pen and, like the court 
of appeals, construed the public-possession provision narrowly to 
cover only intoxicants. That was enough for the minority to prevail, 
so the public-possession law was upheld on a two-to-four vote. 131 
The absence of one justice in Chester meant that the six partici-
pating justices would have had to agree unanimously that the statute 
was unconstitutional. As McBride showed two decades earlier, 132 the 
lack of a full bench could prevent the supreme court from invalidating 
an unconstitutional law. This situation finally received serious atten-
tion soon after Chester was decided, although it is not clear that this 
case was the impetus for change. In 1943, the Judicial Council of 
Ohio recommended that Article IV, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion be amended to allow a court of appeals judge to sit by designa-
tion whenever a member of the Ohio Supreme Court was "unable, by 
reason of illness, disability, disqualification, or other cause," to par-
ticipate in a case. 133 The principal rationale for this recommendation 
was the need to provide litigants with a full bench to avoid the pros-
pect of three-to-three deadlocks, a phenomenon that had occurred 
thirteen times between 1932 and 1942Y4 The recommendation went 
on to note that failing to replace justices who could not hear a case 
placed an "unfair burden" on appellants challenging the validity of 
statutes, particularly when more than one justice did not participate.135 
The voters approved this change in 1944, but it did not address the 
critics' other concerns nor did it end the phenomenon of minority 
decisions upholding the constitutionality of challenged laws. 
The early 1950s produced a spate of new decisions under the su-
permajority provision. In University of Cincinnati v. Board of Tax 
Appeals,136 five justices concluded that two statutes exempting real 
estate owned by educational institutions from property taxes were 
invalid because they conferred a broader exemption than was consti-
129 /d. at 994 (emphasis added). 
130 See id. at 999 (Hart, J., joined by Turner, Matthias & Zimmerman, JJ., dissenting). 
131 
See id. at 995. 
132 
See supra notes I 07-08 and accompanying text. 
133 
SIXTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OHIO TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
OHIO 16 (1943). 
134 
See id. at 16-17. 
135 
Jd.atl7. 
136 91 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio 1950). 
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tutionally permissible. 137 The constitutional provision dealt with 
"public school houses," whereas the statutes exempted income re-
ceived by educational institutions and public school districts. Two 
justices questioned the wisdom of the statutes but found no constitu-
tional infirmity. 138 Accordingly, the superrnajority requirement meant 
that the laws were upheld by a two-to-five vote. 139 
Another minority vote upheld a statute exempting certain munici-
pal police and fire personnel from worker's compensation coverage in 
State ex rel. English v. Industrial Commission. 140 The statute denied 
worker's compensation to police officers and firefighters who were 
eligible for pensions; 141 the injured firefighter was receiving more 
from his pension than he would have gotten from worker's compensa-
tion. 142 Although the precise vote was not indicated, the court in its 
initial ruling and again on rehearing said that a majority, but fewer 
than six justices, believed the law was unconstitutional and that this 
was insufficient to overturn the law. 143 
Similarly, in State ex rel. Steer v. Baber, 144 the court invoked the 
superrnajority rule to uphold a provision that required an administra-
tor's consent before a person at least seventy years old could be 
committed to a state mental health institution. 145 It is not clear that the 
rule affected this decision, however, as only three justices agreed that 
the provision in question conferred unfettered discretion or arbitrary 
administrative authority. 146 
Then in Grandle v. Rhodes, 147 the court first invoked and then 
avoided the supermajority requirement. At issue was an appropriation 
from the Highway Improvement Fund for preliminary studies on a 
project to build a parking garage beneath the state capitol. 148 When 
the case was first argued, the court viewed the controlling issue as 
being whether the appropriation for plannirtg a parking garage was for 
constitutionally required highway purposes. Four justices concluded 
137 
See id. at 503-04. 
138 
See id. at 504 (opinion of Stewart & Taft, JJ.). 
139 
Seeid. 
140 
115 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio 1953), adhered to on reh'g, 117 N.E.2d 22 (Ohio 1954). 
141 
See id. at 396 (opinion of Taft, J.). 
142 
See id. at 395. 
143 
See id. at 396; State ex rei. English, 117 N.E.2d at 23. 
118 N.E.2d 530 (Ohio 1954) (per curiam). 144 
145 
See id. at 531. 
146 
147 
See id. (Stewart, J., joined by Weygandt, C.J., and Middleton, J., dissenting). 
139 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio 1956) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam on reh 'g, 140 N.E.2d 897 
(Ohio 1957). 
148 
See Grandle, 139 N.E.2d at 328. 
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that the appropriation was unconstitutional, 149 but three others dis-
agreed. Because fewer than six justices thought there was a constitu-
tional problem, the challenge to the appropriation failed. 150 On rehear-
ing, the court determined that the supermajority requirement was 
never triggered because the appropriation was not for "statutory 
highway purposes" and hence did not authorize the expenditure of 
Highway Improvement Fund money for the project. 151 Despite an 
apoplectic (and now solitary) dissent objecting to this feat of leger-
demain in a case where the legal arguments at every stage had fo-
cused on the constitutional issue, 152 a five-to-one vote upheld the 
challenge to the use of the highway fund but rsermitted the use of 
other revenue for the preliminary garage studies. 53 
The final 1950s case presented one last problem with the super-
majority requirement, that of determining when a law has been de-
clared unconstitutional. In R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department 
of Education, 154 the court divided five-to-two on this question. At 
issue was the Ohio Motion Picture Censorship Act, which required 
state approval before movies could be shown. The Ohio Supreme 
Court upheld this scheme in Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of 
Education, 155 which affirmed the censorship division's refusal to 
permit the showing of the film version of Richard Wright's Native 
Son and other movies. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed 
that judgment in a one-sentence ruling that cited its 1952 decision 
invalidating a similar New York statute. 156 Other distributors quickly 
challenged the denial of permits to show their movies, arguing that 
the U.S. Supreme Court's summary reversal in Superior Films had 
invalidated Ohio's censorship law. A five-judge majority of the Ohio 
Supreme Court agreed with this claim but noted that the lack of a 
sixth vote prevented the state court from holding the law unconstitu-
tional.157 Two justices resisted the conclusion that Superior Films had 
nullified the statute, contending that the grounds for that summary 
disposition were ambiguous. 158 The majority opinion avoided the pos-
149 
See id. at 329-30 (Bell, J., joined by Hart, Zimmerman & Stewart, JJ ., dissenting). 
150 
See id. at 329. 
151 
See Grand/e, 140 N.E.2d at 897-98. 
152 
See id. at 899-900 (Weygandt, C.J., dissenting). 
153 See id. at 898. 
154 
122 N.E.2d 769 (Ohio 1954). 
155 
112 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio 1953). 
156 
Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't ofEduc., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam) (citing Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (I 952)). 
157 
See R.KO. Radio Pictures, Inc., 122 N.E.2d at 771. 
158 See id. at 772 (Weygandt, C.J., dissenting); id. at 775 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
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sibility of a minority veto by determining that, because the U.S. Su-
preme Court's ruling was binding, a censorship order that was based 
on the controversial statute could not have been proper. 159 
ill. THE DEMISE OF THE SUPERMAJORITY RULE 
In short, by the time Mapp reached the Ohio Supreme Court, 
many problems with the supermajority requirement had become clear. 
The court had struggled to define what "laws" were covered by the 
requirement, faced the difficulty of deciding constitutional challenges 
with less than a full bench, divided over what it meant to say that a 
law had been "held" unconstitutional, tried to avoid the requirement 
when possible, and faced the disconcerting possibility that laws 
would be valid in some places but void in others due to the differing 
attitudes of the courts of appeals. Some of these problems had been 
resolved. The court got out of its self-imposed predicament about 
municipal ordinances, and the 1944 amendment provided for a full 
bench when disability or recusal forced one or more justices not to sit 
in particular cases. But nothing had been done to address the prospect 
of inconsistent rulings, a prospect that should have been obvious to 
Peck and the other 1912 convention delegates when they added the 
exception to the supermajority requirement for cases in which the 
court of appeals had also found a law unconstitutional. Finally, the 
prospects for invalidating the requirement were bleak. The U.S. Su-
preme Court had turned aside a federal constitutional challenge thirty 
years earlier in Bryant, and no case had arisen to test the possibility 
left open in that case that inconsistent rulings in different appellate 
districts might violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
For all the controversy Mapp generated, that decision did not un-
dermine the supermajority rule. Shortly after the Ohio Supreme Court 
failed to invalidate the obscenity statute, another criminal defendant 
sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. In Toth v. Gilbert, 160 a 
three-judge federal district court denied the injunction. The court re-
fused to intervene in a pending state prosecution, explaining that there 
were no grounds to assume the state courts' inadequacy in addressing 
First Amendment issues 161 and noting the possibility of review by the 
U.S. Supreme Court if necessary. 162 
159 
See id. at 771. 
160 
184 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (3-judge court). 
161 
See id. at 168. 
162 
See id. at 170. 
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There were two last episodes in the supermajority saga before the 
requirement was laid to rest. One dealt with highway funding. In State 
ex rel. Lynch v. Rhodes, 163 a four-member majority concluded that the 
sale of certificates of obligation to finance highway projects were 
state debts that violated constitutional provisions regulating the incur-
rence of debts. 164 Because three other justices disagreed, the constitu-
tional challenge failed on a three-to-four vote. 165 
The last episode involved Ohio's fair-trade laws, which allowed 
manufacturers to require their products to be sold at minimum prices 
despite the desire of some retailers to offer discounts. Mter the state 
supreme court invalidated one fair-trade statute in 1958,166 the legisla-
ture enacted a new statute that sought to address the defects of the 
original. In Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjolzn Co., 167 a four-
member majority of the supreme court concluded that the new law 
contained the same constitutional defects as did the old. 168 Three of 
their colleagues disagreed, resulting in another three-to-four ruling 
upholding the validity of a statute. 169 The U.S. Supreme Court af-
firmed on the basis of a federal statute authorizing state fair-trade 
laws. 170 Justice Goldberg's opinion in an eight-to-one decision al-
luded to Ohio's supermajority requirement but attached no special 
significance to it. 171 But this did not end the fair-trade story. As with 
the free-water law three decades earlier, 172 some lower courts held the 
new fair-trade law invalid under the Ohio Constitution. 173 Accord-
ingly, the law was valid in some parts of the state but not in others. 
The supreme court fmally resolved the matter in a four-to-three-deci-
sion upholding the statute in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. On-
tario Store of Price Hill, Inc. 174 
The supermajority requirement was repealed on May 7, 1968, 
when the voters approved the Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio 
Constitution. This proposal substantially revised Article IV, the judi-
ciary chapter, to reorganize the court system and rationalize the be-
163 
208 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio 1965) (per curiam). 
164 
165 
See id. at 911 (Taft, CJ.,joined by Zimmerman, Matthias & O'Neill, JJ.). 
See id. at 906. 
166 
See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc .. 147 N.E.2d 481 (Ohio 1958). 
167 
190 N.E.2d 460 (Ohio 1963). 
168 
See id. at 466 (Zimmerman, 1 ., joined by Matthias, O'Neill & Gibson, 11 ., dissenting). 
169 
See id. at 465-66 (Griffith, 1 ., joined by Taft, CJ ., and Herbert, 1.). 
170 
See Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964). 
171 See id. at 388 & n.3. 
172 
See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
173 See, e.g., Bu1ova Watch Co. v. Ontario Store, 176 N.E.2d 527 (Ohio C.P. 1961 ). 
174 
223 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio 1967). 
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wildering set of tribunals below the courts of appeals. 175 Eliminating 
the supermajority requirement was little more than a footnote to the 
larger project, and the repeal provoked almost no debate. 176 Just over 
a month after the vote, the supreme court in City of Euclid v. 
Heaton177 held that the repeal had taken effect immediately. 178 
CONCLUSION 
The demise of Ohio's supermajority requirement suggests that 
this well-intentioned experiment was at best a noble failure, at worst a 
disaster that endured far too long. Proponents viewed the requirement 
as a way to protect progressive reforms against a hostile judiciary. To 
a degree--but only to a degree--the proponents were correct. Some 
worker's compensation laws survived because the court lacked the 
necessary six votes to overturn them. A good example is Williams, in 
which a three-member minority was able to uphold a law providing 
compensation to employees of insolvent companies. 179 Other worker 
victories were more ambiguous, though. The fifty percent penalty 
provision that was upheld in DeWitt survived only because two jus-
tices voted to sustain it against five who regarded it as unconstitu-
tional.180 Only five years later, one of the two justices in the minority 
was replaced by a new judge who sided with the majority, providing 
the crucial sixth vote to invalidate the fifty percent penalty provision 
in Hershner. 181 And even when there were at least two justices sym-
pathetic to worker interests, a creative majority could evade the six-
vote requirement by statutory construction, as Patten shows. 182 
These cases suggest that the supermajority requirement made it 
more difficult for the Ohio Supreme Court to invalidate legislation. 
There might also have been cases in which the court, without explic-
itly addressing the requirement, interpreted statutes narrowly to avoid 
a potential constitutional issue. No evidence supporting this hypothe-
sis has come to light, however. 
In any event, judicial deference to the legislature is not always 
desirable. Later rulings like R.K.O. and Mapp suggest that the super-
175 See generally William W. Milligan & James E. Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts 
Amendmellt to the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 811 ( 1968). 
176 
See id. at 84 5-46. 
177 
238 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1968). 
178 
ld. at 796. 
179 
See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
180 
See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
181 
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
182 
See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
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majority requirement made it more difficult to sustain civil liberties 
claims, particularly those involving the First Amendment. The Ohio 
Supreme Court's Mapp ruling, in which only four justices regarded 
the obscenity law as unconstitutional, graphically illustrates the point. 
Only because of the supermajority requirement did Dollree Mapp lose 
in the state courts. 183 But R.K. 0. also suggests the fragility of First 
Amendment claims under a system that was promoted by an earlier 
group of progressives. Had it not been for the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the Ohio movie censorship law would have remained on the books 
even longer than it did because only five Ohio justices saw the 
scheme as constitutionally troublesome. 184 
The worker's compensation cases suggest that the real problem 
was never the number of votes required to declare a law unconstitu-
tional but rather the composition of the judiciary. If the members of 
the supreme court were chosen by a process that favored employer 
interests, a supermajority requirement could have only limited value. 
Yet the system of electing judges has become firmly entrenched de-
spite persistent criticism that some form of merit selection would pro-
duce a better and more enlightened judiciary. 185 
Meanwhile, the difficulty in deciding whether municipal ordi-
nances were subject to the supermajority requirement and the compli-
cations arising from the absence of a full bench might be taken as 
evidence of deeper problems with the requirement. 186 Both of those 
situations were addressed after some delay, the former by the supreme 
court and the latter through a constitutional amendment. 187 
Perhaps the most disturbing problem was the exception for cases 
in which the supreme court affirmed a court of appeals judgment of 
unconstitutionality, because this provision held out the real possibility 
of inconsistent decisions in different appellate districts. 188 As previ-
ously remarked, the difficulties posed by the exception were entirely 
foreseeable when it was proposed at the 1912 constitutional conven-
183 
See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
IJ!.I 
See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. 
185 
See, e.g., Francis R. Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement and Compensation of 
Judges in Ohio, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 408 (1931); Fred J. Milligan, The Proposed Changes in the 
Selection and Tenure of Judges in Ohio, 4 Omo ST. L.J. 157 (1938). Even the ugly 2000 su-
preme court election campaign has not shaken the faith of supporters of judicial elections, some 
of the most vociferous of whom come from organized labor. See Julie Carr Smyth, Legislators 
Uninterested in Appointed Judges: Chief Justice Seeking Allies to Push Idea, CLEV. PLAIN 
DEALER, Jan. 18, 2001, at 2B. For further discussion of that campaign, see Jonathan L. Entin, 
Judicial Selection and Political Culture, CAP. U. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
186 
See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text. 
187 
See supra notes I 03-05 & 133-35 and accompanying text. 
188 
See supra notes 86-95 & 173-74 and accompanying text. 
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tion. 189 This problem could easily have been remedied by a further 
amendment like the 1944 change authorizing the use of court of ap-
peals judges sitting by designation to provide a full supreme court 
bench when necessary, but it never was. Instead, this relatively minor 
feature became a lightning rod for criticism of the whole superrnajor-
ity idea. 190 
Things need not have turned out that way. The Ohio experiment 
attracted attention around the country when it was adopted, as well as 
during the New Deal. Two other states adopted similar proposals 
within a few years of Ohio's action. North Dakota amended its consti-
tution in 1918 to require the concurrence of four of the five justices 
for the state supreme court to invalidate a law. 191 Two years later Ne-
braska adopted a five-vote requirement for its seven-member supreme 
court to declare a law unconstitutional. 192 North Dakota's provision 
has generated almost no controversy. The supermajority provision has 
come into play in only half a dozen reported decisions, and supreme 
court justices have accepted the requirement without apparent com-
plaint.193 The Nebraska requirement did not affect a decision for 
nearly half a century after its adoption. The first case in which the 
requirement actually applied was decided in 1968. 194 Several more 
cases followed in short order. 195 Those rulings prompted criticism and 
189 See supra notes 45-46,94 & 118 and accompanying text. 
190 
See Fite & Rubinstein, supra note 68, at 776. 
191 
See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 89 (repealed and reenacted as N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4 
(1976)). See generally Herbert L. Meschke & Ted Smith, The North Dakota Supreme Court: A 
Century of Advances, 76 N.D. L. REV. 217, 247-48 (2000). 
192 
See NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2. 
193 
Judicial acquiescence was apparent in the very first case affected by the supermajority 
requirement. See Daly v. Beery, 178 N.W. 104, Ill (N.D. 1920) (Birdzell, J.) (noting the need 
to concur in the disposition due to the supermajority rule and stating that the court must "respect 
it as a part of the fundamental law"). For other cases in which the North Dakota Supreme Court 
has applied the supermajority rule without objection, see Haney v. North Dakota Workers 
Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the 
exclusion of farm laborers from worker's compensation); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 
N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994) (rejecting a challenge to the state's system of financing public educa-
tion); State ex rei. Mason v. Baker, 288 N.W. 202 (N.D. 1939) (rejecting a challenge to the 
creation of a commission to revise the state code); State ex rei. Sathre v. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. 
Lands, 262 N.W. 60 (N.D. 1935) (rejecting a challenge to a law authorizing discounting of 
interest due on loans made by the agency administering the state's school trust fund); Wilson v. 
City of Fargo, 186 N.W. 263 (N.D. 1921) (rejecting a challenge to a measure providing for 
popular vote to override tax limits). 
194 
See In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171 (Neb. 1968) (rejecting a challenge to a compulsory 
sterilization statute for institutionalized mental patients), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cavitt v. 
Nebraska, 396 U.S. 996 (1970). 
195 
See DeBacker v. Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508 (Neb. 1968) (rejecting a constitutional 
challenge to juvenile court statute), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 28 (1969); State ex rei. Belker v. 
Bd. of Educ. Lands and Funds, 171 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1969) (rejecting a challenge to the valid-
ity of a statute authorizing the sale of land held in trust for public schools), adhered to on reiz 'g, 
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a proposaJ to repeaJ the supermajority requirement. 196 The proposaJ 
was not adopted, and the supermajority requirement remains on the 
books, where it has affected only one subsequent decision. 197 
Only one other state considered a supermajority rule during the 
Progressive era; Minnesota decided against such a requirement in 
1914.198 It is difficult to know whether the unpopularity of this ap-
proach stems from Ohio's unfortunate experience or from a general 
appreciation for at least the principle of judicia] review, if not the 
outcome of every case. It remains unclear whether such a requirement 
offends any federal constitutionaJ provision. The only time since Bry-
ant that the U.S. Supreme Court considered a supermajority rule came 
in the 1979 case of Torres v. Puerto Rico, 199 which avoided passing 
on the validity of a Puerto Rican constitutionaJ provision requiring an 
absolute majority of the commonwealth's eight-member supreme 
court to invalidate a statute. The case arose from a warrantless arrest 
and search at the San Juan airport. By a four-to-three vote the Puerto 
Rico Supreme Court ruled that the search was improper, but five 
votes were required to overturn the local law under which the search 
had occurred, so the law remained valid.200 The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed, concluding that, regardless of the validity of the supermajor-
ity requirement, the search made in pursuance of the statute indeed 
violated the Fourth Amendment.201 
This most recent development reminds us that supermajority re-
quirements are more plausibly evaluated as a matter of wisdom or 
policy than as matters of federaJ constitutional command. The un-
popularity of supermajority provisions is reflected in the complete 
absence of support for the idea not only at the state level but also at 
the federal level. This is particularly noteworthy during a period of 
narrow division on the U.S. Supreme Court on such contentious mat-
175 N.W.2d 63 (Neb.), cert. denied sub nom. Belker v. Bd. of Educ. Lands and Funds, 400 U.S. 
806 (1970); DeBacker v. Sigler, 175 N.W.2d 912 (Neb. 1970) (rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to the state's system of classifying juvenile offenders), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 926 
(1971). 
196 
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REv. 329 (1969); William Jay Riley, Comment, To Require That a Majority of the Supreme 
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See Hausser, supra note 96, at 55 n.3. 
442 u.s. 465 (1979). 
See id. at 467-68. 
See id. at 468 n.2, 471. See also id. at 474 n.*, 475 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, 
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment). 
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ters as abortion, affirmative action, and federalism. Ohio's experience 
suggests that the advantages of such an approach are marginal at best. 
Perhaps the requirement of more than a simple majority to invalidate 
a law promotes greater judicial deference to legislatures. At the same 
time, the Ohio approach demonstrates the serious problems that can 
arise from poorly considered provisions. As John Marshall reminded 
us, "it is a constitution we are expounding. "202 Perhaps we should 
hesitate to tinker with it too drastically. 
Meanwhile, let us return to Dollree Mapp. We cannot say that her 
case contributed significantly to the demise of the supermajority re-
quirement. Still, hers was one of the last cases in which the require-
ment played any role. It affected only when and on what theory she 
would be released. Without the requirement, the state supreme court 
surely would have invalidated the obscenity law that she was charged 
with violating. Instead, she had to await the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision applying the Exclusionary Rule to the states and finding the 
search that led to her arrest to have been unlawful. Without the fruits 
of that search, the authorities had no basis to prosecute her. 
202 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (frrst emphasis added). 
